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Articles
THE RIGHT TO IGNORE THE LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT VERSUS
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Honorable Robert D. Rucker*
"In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts." Cited as Article 1, Section 19, this
simply worded provision is part of the Bill of Rights contained in the
Indiana Constitution. Adopted in 1851, nearly a century and a half ago,
the provision has never been repealed, amended, or modified. However,
as currently interpreted by Indiana's courts of review, the jury's right to
determine the law has been at least severely restricted. At most the
jury's right has been entirely eliminated.
Viewed through the lenses of the historical development of Article
1, Section 19 and the events surrounding its enactment, there is an
alternative interpretation. This paper represents a modest attempt to
explore a construction of Section 19 that preserves to the jury a right
likely intended by the framers, and one that is consistent with the text of
the Constitution.
I.

A.

ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND

The Jury's Exercise of Authority in Colonialand Post-ColonialAmerica

Although the details are obscured by antiquity, the doctrine of
permitting juries to determine both the law and the facts has its origins
in Medieval England.' As developed and observed in colonial America,
the doctrine is usually traced to the events surrounding the postmedieval trial of William Penn and William Meade. The trial lead to
Bushell's Case,2 so named for the foreman of the Penn and Meade jury. In
August 1670, twenty-six year old William Penn attended a Quaker
meeting on Gracechurch Street in London, England.3 The meeting "was

Judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals. L.L.M. (University of Virginia 1998); J.D.
(Valparaiso University 1976); B.A. (Indiana University 1974).
1See generally Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, out of
Mind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 267 (1974).
2 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
3 D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD, THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS 55 (1966).
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so large that 'it was more like a tumult than a solid assembly. ' " 4 Penn
did most of the speaking, but ultimately he and a linen draper by the
name of William Meade were arrested and indicted for disturbing the
peace. At trial the pair effectively admitted preaching to the assembly,
but argued the law under which they were indicted was invalid. 5 The
prosecution called three witnesses who testified they observed Penn
speaking to the gathering but did not hear what was said. The only
evidence against Meade was that he was present when Penn spoke. The
court ordered the jury to return a verdict of guilty, because according to
the court, "if the jury found the Quakers had met at all, then the very
meeting by itself was unlawful and, therefore, it followed as a matter of
course that the peace was disturbed." 6 Thus charged, the jury retired to
consider the verdict. Within an hour and a half, eight jurors returned to
convict, but four refused to return to court until ordered to do so. 7 The
trial judge, London's Lord Mayor, Sir Samuel Starling, 8 identifying
Edward Bushell as the leader, threatened the jury and sent them back for
further deliberations. They returned with a unanimous verdict: "We
find William Penn guilty of speaking to an assembly in Gracechurch
Street and that William Meade is not guilty of the said indictment." 9
Apparently expecting a verdict of guilty to the charge of violating the
Conventicle Act, the Recorder then addressed the jurors:
gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a
verdict that the court will accept; and you shall be
locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you

41d.
5 Penn and Meade were ultimately charged with "preaching to an unlawful assembly in
violation of the Conventicle Act of 1670, which prohibited the public expression of religious
beliefs in any manner not in accord with the Church of England's beliefs and practices."
Stephen G. Morrison & John F. Kuppens, A Response to Jury Nullification: Legal Justice v.
"People's Justice," 4 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 56 (1996).
6 J. KENDALL FEW, 1 IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY JURY 137 (1993). In return for the Anglican
Church's adherence to the doctrines of the divine right of kings, passive obedience, and
non-resistance, Charles II gave the Anglican majority in the 1661 Parliament free reign to
pass legislation favorable to the Church of England. As a result, several items of legislation
were passed aimed primarily at the nonconformist Society of Friends, commonly referred
to as Quakers. The Corporation Act of 1661 required all local office holders to take
sacraments according to the rites of the Church of England. The Act of Uniformity of 1661
required all ministers to use the revised Book of Common Prayer. And the Conventicle Act
of 1664 prohibited any religious assembly not held in accordance with the established
liturgy of the Church of England. As a result many Quakers were imprisoned. Id. at 136.
1 Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right To Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1973).
8 FEW, supra note 6, at 137.
9 Id. at 138.
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shall not think thus to abuse the court; we will have a
verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve for it.10
Although deprived of food, water, and heat, the jury persisted in its
course for two days and nights refusing to bring in a different verdict.
Finally the court ended the trial abruptly, imposing a fine of forty marks
each, and imprisoning the jurors until the fines were paid.11 Bushell and
the other jurors then obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the Court of
Common Pleas. In a decision concurred in by all the judges of England
except one, 12 the court abolished the practice of punishing juries for their
verdicts. 13 Speaking on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice Sir John
Vaughan relied in part on the medieval concept of jurors as quasiwitnesses and reasoned that it would be "absurd [that] a jury should be
fined by the judge for against their Evidence, when he who fineth knows
what it is.. .[For the better and greater part of the Evidence may be
wholly unknown to him; and this may happen in most Cases, and often
doth."14 The Chief Justice continued:
They [the jury] resolve both law and fact complicatedly,
and not the fact by itself; so as though they answer not
singly to the question of what is the law, yet they
determine the law in all matters, where issue is joined
and tried in the principal case, but where the verdict is
special.15
Resolving that if a jury returns a verdict contrary to its conscience it
would be in violation of its oath, the court determined:
A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear by
another's ear; no more can a man conclude or infer the
thing to be resolved by another's understanding or
reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury give,
yet they, being not assured it is so from their own

10Scheflin, supra note 7, at 170.
11FEw, supra note 6, at 137.

The sole exception was Justice Kelyng who had imposed a fine on a jury five years
earlier. See David Farnham, The Long Tradition of Jury Nullification, A.B.A. J., Vol IH,No. 4,6
12

(1997).
13 Scheflin,

supra note 7, at 170.

14Farnham, supra note 12, at 6.

IsSparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 122-23 (1895) (dissenting, Justice Gray quoted Bushell's

Case).
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The impact of Bushell's Case was felt in colonial over a half century
later. Citing Bushell's Case as authority, Alexander Hamilton, in the 1735
libel trial of publisher John Peter Zenger, argued to the jury its right to
determine both the law and the facts. Zenger was the only printer in
New York who would print material not authorized by the British
mayor. His newspaper, the New York Weekly Law Journal, generally
exposed corruption among governmental officials. 17 The paper often
criticized the Royal Governor of New York, William Cosby, who was
accused of numerous acts of official misconduct. 18 At that time, freedom
of the press only meant freedom from prior restraint. Once an
uncomplimentary article was published, the author of the article was
subject to prosecution for libel. 19 In this instance the articles were
unsigned; however, Zenger's name appeared as the publisher. 2° A grand
jury was convened but refused to indict. Nonetheless Zenger was
arrested and charged by information with seditious libel.21 There was no
dispute that Zenger did not write the articles. Further, it is not clear
whether Zenger even agreed with the articles' content. Nonetheless, if
the jury had followed the court's instruction, then they would have been
compelled to return a verdict of guilty. In summation Hamilton argued
that the jurors "have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the
law and the facts, and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to
do so." 22 Hamilton also urged the jury, in the paraphrased words of
Chief Justice Vaughan, "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their
own ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in
judging of the lives, liberties or estate of their fellow subjects." 23
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.24 Although

16Id.at 123.
17Scheflin, supra note 7, at 173.
IsMorrison & Kuppens, supra note 5, at 57.
19FEW, supra note 6, at 157.
2 Id.
21

Id.

Scheflin, supra note 7, at 173 (quoting JOHN R. ALEXANDER,
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 99 (1963)).
2

2

A

BRIEF NARRATION OF THE

Id. at 174.

Apparently Hamilton's success generated a great deal of attention.
"The
jurors.. .jubilantly acquitted Zenger. That night Hamilton was honored at a civic banquet;
vessels in the harbor boomed their cannons upon his departure for Philadelphia; and the
Board of Aldermen sent after him the keys of the city in a gold box." FEW, supra note 6, at
157 (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE BIRTH OF A NATION 163 (1968)).
24
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generally accepted as the premier case establishing freedom of the press
and the legal doctrine that truth is an absolute defense to libel, the
Zenger case established those concepts only because Hamilton appealed
2
successfully to the jury for nullification of the controlling law. 5
In open disregard to the judge's instructions concerning the law,
colonial juries frequently refused to enforce navigation acts passed by
the British Parliament. 26 Those laws were enacted to channel all colonial
trade through England, and colonial juries frequently released ships
impounded by the British for violating the Acts. In response to the
colonial juries, the British established courts of vice-admiralty to handle
maritime cases. These courts acted without juries-a fact that embittered
the colonists and represented a major grievance contributing to the
American Revolution. 27 Inspired in part by distrust of governmental
authority, the principle that juries could evaluate and decide questions of
both law and fact was widely accepted by leading jurists even before the
1776 Revolution. 28 For John Adams this notion was reflected in the
democratic principle that just as with other decisions of government,
"the common people.. .should have as complete control, as decisive a
negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature." 29 After the
Revolution, the notion of the jury as judge of the law as well as the fact
was still accepted as the norm. For example, in 1841 the Maine Supreme
Court held that the jury in criminal cases had a right to disregard the
court's instructions on matters of law; the lower courts of New York
during the first thirty years of the century generally left questions of law
to the juries in all criminal cases; there is evidence the early practice in
Virginia was that the jury had the right to determine questions of
criminal law; until 1871 the Supreme Court of Louisiana consistently
reiterated that in criminal cases the jury had not only the power but the
right to disregard the judge's instructions. 3" Federal courts until 1835
and Justices of the Supreme Court had consistently instructed juries that

25

Farnham, supra note 12, at 6.

26Scheflin, supra note 7, at 174.
27 Id. (citing HELEN H. MILLER, THE CASE FOR LIBERTY 163-202 (1965); CHARLES McLEAN
ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1934)).
28

Scheflin, supra note 7, at 174. See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries As Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 605 (1939) (quoting passages from the Diary of John Adams for
the proposition that although the question of the uncontrolled right of the jury to
determine matters of law does not appear to have been conclusively settled by accepted
practice before the Revolution, the legal profession, at least, was aware of it).
29
30

Scheflin, supranote 7, at 175 (quoting LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 2 (C.F. ed. 1856).

Howe, supra note 28, at 596-98 n.57, 58.
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they were "the judges both of the law and the fact in criminal cases, and
31
are not bound by the opinion of the court."
There is general agreement among many commentators that the
right of the jury to decide questions of law and fact in criminal cases
prevailed in this country until the middle of the 1800s.32 The underlying
rationale for the jury's law determining function in criminal cases, as
distinguished from a similar function in civil cases is not altogether
clear. 33 However, there is support for the view that in the early stages of
this country's democracy the criminal law was less complex than the civil

31Howe, supra note 28, at 589 (footnote references omitted). It should also be observed that
recognizing a jury's right to decide the law as well as the facts was not the sole province of
the judicial branch of government in colonial America. In 1798 the Federalist dominated
Congress enacted the Sedition Act which sought to insulate the Federalist party from
criticism by Republican newspapers. The Act provided in part "if any person shall be
prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be
lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence in his defense, the
truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the Jury who shall try
the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and thefact, under the direction of the court, as in
other cases." See Act for the Punishment of CertainCrime, (July 14, 1798), I Stat. 596, reprinted
in, CHARLES MCCURDY, GRADUATE PROGRAM FOR JUDGES-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY PART 1183 (1996) (emphasis added).
32Scheflin, supra note 7, at 177 (noting Mark DeWolfe Howe, juries As Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1930) and Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 984 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (dissenting opinion of Judge Wright)).
33 Although the main focus was directed toward the role of the jury in criminal cases, the
right of the jury to decide questions of law was not restricted to criminal cases only. In
colonial Pennsylvania for example "upon occasion, even in civil cases, questions of law
were determined by the jury." Howe, supra note 28, at 594 (citing Lessee of Albertson v.
Robeson, I Dallas 9 (1764); Boehm v. Engle, I Dallas 15 (1767); Lessee of Proprietary v.
Ralston, I Dallas 18 (1773); Anonymous, I Dallas 20 (1773)). The same was true for colonial
Connecticut. In a 1788 civil case the plaintiff moved in arrest of judgment after the jury
returned a verdict against him. According to the plaintiff "the jury had mistaken the law
and evidence in the case." The trial court denied the motion declaring "[iut doth not vitiate
a verdict, that the jury have mistaken the law or the evidence; for by the practice of this
state, they are judges of both...." Howe, supra note 28, at 601 (citing Witter v. Brewster,
Kirby 422,423 (Conn. 1788)). Also, in one of the few jury trials ever held under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay instructed a civil jury that
it may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on
questions of law, it is the province of the court, to decide. But it must
be observed by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable
distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the
fact in controversy.... (B]oth objects are lawfully within your power of
decision.
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dallas 1, 4 (1794).
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law. Thus, the argument continues, the jury should have the right to
decide law in criminal cases.34
B.

ConstitutionMaking and Enactment of the Provision

Under provisions of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Congress
established the Indiana Territory in July 1800. 3 5 Vincennes, with its
sizeable French population, was the territorial Capitol. Twenty-seven
year old Virginia-born William Henry Harrison was appointed by
President John Adams as the territorial governor. 36 Originally extending
from the Ohio border to the Mississippi River and north to the Canadian
border, the Indiana Territory was soon divided into what is now known
as the states of Michigan and Illinois. 37 As a result of the reduced size of
the territory and the increased population growth in the southeastern
section, the territorial Capitol was moved from Vincennes to Corydon in
1813.3
The Ordinance of 1787 provided, among other things, that once
60,000 inhabitants resided in the territory, it could then petition for
statehood and admission to the union.39 Having met the terms and
conditions set forth in the Ordinance, the Indiana territorial legislature
petitioned Congress for admission into the union in 1811. The war of
1812 delayed action on the petition, and it was resubmitted in 1815. On

See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 180
(1964), referring to debates in the 1851 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention over an
amendment that would give juries in criminal cases the right to determine the law as well
as the facts. The distinction between the complexity of the civil common law versus the
simplicity of the criminal law "was used to explain the fact that the jury's right to decide
the law was claimed only in criminal cases." See also Sparfv.United States, 156 U.S. 51, 17374 (1895) (Justice Gray dissenting) (stating "[t]he rules and principles of the criminal law
are, for the most part, elementary and simple, and easily understood by jurors taken from
the body of the people. As every citizen or subject is conclusively presumed to know the
law.. .a jury of his peers must be presumed to have equal knowledge, and, especially after
being aided by the explanation and exposition of the law by counsel and court, to be
capable of applying it to the facts as proved by the evidence before them").
35
See JAMES H. MADISON, THE INDIANA WAY-A STATE HISTORY 49 (1986).
34

6

3

Id.

Id. at 34, 46.
. Id. at 46.
39 More particularly the Ordinance provided:
[w]henever any of the said States shall have 60,000 free inhabitants
therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the
Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original
states in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a
permanent constitution and State government.
3

CHARLES KEFILEBOROUGH, 1 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 1780-1851 xviii (1971).
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April 19, 1816, Congress passed an Enabling Act authorizing the
inhabitants of the Indiana Territory to elect delegates to a convention,
form a State Government, and assume a name. 4° Two months later, on
41
June 10, 1816, the Constitutional Convention assembled at Corydon.
Consisting of forty-three delegates elected from the thirteen
counties into which the territory was then divided, membership of the
42
convention was composed primarily of men south of the Ohio River.
Most delegates had some experience in government, and most had some
legal training. 43 Lasting slightly less than three weeks, the convention
adjourned June 29, 1816. With the exception of the provision relating to
amendments, the Constitution as drafted was taken in its entirety both in
substance and in phraseology from the Ohio Constitution of 1802 and the
Kentucky Constitution of 1799. 44 Section 10 of the Bill of Rights in the
1816 Constitution provided the following:
In prosecution for the publication of papers
investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a
public capacity, or when the matter published is proper
for the public information, the truth thereof may be
given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
4
facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. 5
This was the language as reported out of committee without amendment
in either form or substance. There is no report of a debate or comment
on this provision. However, it is nearly identical to the Sedition Act of
1798, enacted by Congress eighteen years earlier. Although never
submitted to the electorate for official ratification, the Constitution took
effect immediately.46 On December 11, 1816, President James Madison
47
signed the Congressional resolution admitting Indiana into the Union.

40 KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at xv.
41Id. at xvii.
4 MADISON, supra note 35, at 51.
43Id.
44Id.
45 JOURNALS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF INDIANA TERRIrrORY 1805-1815, 25-26 (1950)
(emphasis added).
46
MADISON, supra note 35, at 51.
47 Id. at 54.
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Within four years of the new constitution's enactment, there were
calls for a Constitutional Convention to amend it.48 There were a
number of unpopular provisions in the 1816 document, including the
location of the Capitol in Corydon and the provision requiring annual
meetings of the General Assembly. There were other concerns as well:
the General Assembly was enacting laws in violation of the new
constitution and involving itself in a number of judicial impeachment
trials. 49 The desire for a Constitutional Convention may also have been
inspired by the fashion of the time.5° Most states of the Union and all
those of the former Northwest Territory were engaged in constitutional
rewriting in the late 1840s and early 1850s.51 The question of whether to
call a Constitutional Convention was submitted to the voters at the
general elections of 1823, 1840, 1846, and 1849.52 On the last occasion it
was approved. In the 1849-1850 session of the General Assembly, the
legislature provided for the election of delegates. Elections were so held,
and the Convention assembled on October 7, 1850.5
The Convention consisted of 150 delegates, 95 of whom were
Jacksonian Democrats. Forty-two percent were farmers, twenty-five
percent were lawyers, twelve percent were physicians, and the
remainder were from a variety of other occupations and professionsm
When those with legal training or who later became judges are included,
the percentage of lawyers exceeded thirty-seven percent.M The list of
attorneys who had distinguished themselves, or would do so in the
future, included Thomas Hendricks, U.S. Vice-President, U.S. Senator,
and Indiana Governor; John Petit, U.S. Senator; Alvin P. Hovey, Civil
War General, minister to a foreign country, Indiana Supreme Court
Justice, and Indiana Governor; Samuel Hall, Indiana Lieutenant
Governor; William M. Dunn, U.S. Judge Advocate General; Horace

48 KETrLEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at 139.

49 Id. at 151.
50 MADISON, supra note 35, at 138.
51Id.
5
2KETTLEBOROUGH, supranote 39.
3 Id.

5 MADISON, supra note 35, at 139.
w There were actually 56 men who were either attorneys, had studied law, or were, or
would later become, judges. See Brent E. Dickson et al., Lawyers and Judges as Framers of
Indiana's 1851 Constitution, 30 IND. L. REV. 397, n.2 (1997) (commenting "[t]his topic
presents the difficulty of determining which delegates should be deemed lawyers and
which should not. For purposes of the numbers used in this paper, any delegate who
.practiced law, were judges at any point during their lifetime, or studied law (but never
practiced) are considered lawyers").
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Carter, Indiana Supreme Court Reporter; and James Borden, minister to
a foreign country.56
For purposes of considering, drafting, and
submitting sections to be incorporated into the new constitution, the
convention was divided into twenty-two standing committees.57 In
drafting the new constitution the delegates relied on corresponding
sections from the 1816 Constitution and consulted constitutions of other
states, especially those of Illinois and Wisconsin.58 They also accepted
recommendations and suggestions from members of the several
committees along with other delegates on the convention floor.59
On Monday, October 14, 1850, the ten-person committee on rights
and privileges was formed. 6° The committee including at least one
lawyer, namely John Niles of LaPorte County. 61 To that committee was
referred, among other things, the Bill of Rights of the 1816 Constitution.
Approximately three weeks later on November 2, 1850, the committee
reported the results of its deliberation to the full Convention, which
included a recommendation that the following provision be adopted:
"Sec. 2. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matter alleged to be
libelous may be given in justification, and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts." 62 The report was concurred in and the
sections reported were read a first time and passed a second reading.6 3
Prior to the third reading, a number of the sections in the Bill of Rights
underwent various changes, primarily in form, although some in
substance. 64 When Section 2 was presented for third reading, delegate
Henry P. Thornton 65 from Floyd County addressed the Convention. 66
Expressing doubt that the provision as proposed would allow a party to
give truth as a defense to libel in a civil matter, as opposed to giving such
evidence in a criminal matter, delegate Thornton offered an amendment

56 Dickson et al., supra note 55, at 398.
57 KETILEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at 221.
58Id.
59Id.
60 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION

232 (Austin H. Brown ed. 1850) [hereafter referred to as "JOURNAL"].
61Dickson et al., supra note 55, at 399.
62
JOURNAL, supra note 60, at 187.
6 Id. at 188.
6Id. at 571-78.
6 Delegate Thornton was not a lawyer, but appears to have had some legal training. See 2
REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA: 1848-51 (1935) (hereafter referred to as "REPORT
OF THE DEBATES").
66REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 65, at 1389.
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to resolve the perceived problem.67 Referring to Indiana Supreme Court
decisions on the matter,68 delegate Thornton remarked "[I]t is now
admitted to be well settled law, that, in a criminal case, the jury has an
unquestionable right to decide upon questions of law as of fact, although
they may differ from the court in so doing."69 The amendment passed
without further discussion and was referred to the committee on
revision, arrangement, and phraseology. 70
When the committee
submitted its report, Section 10 was divided into two smaller sections,
comprising Sections 10 and 19 of Article 1 as follows: "Sec. 10. In all
prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libelous, may
be given in justification.. .Sec. 19. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the facts." 1
Ultimately, the delegates completed their work on February 10,
1851. After ratification by the voters, the Constitution became effective
November 1, 1851. 72 It was generally considered the "handiwork" of the
Jacksonian Democrats, whose party commanded a large majority at the
convention.73
II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Prior to ratification of the 1851 Constitution, there were only three
reported decisions in Indiana addressing the role of the jury in criminal
cases. In Townsend v. State,74 a case involving an indictment for retailing
spirituous liquors without a license, the defendant sought an instruction
that would have informed the jury that they were the judges of the law
as well as the fact, and that the power of the court in a criminal case is

67The proposed amendment included inserting "as with any criminal so with any civil
case" after the word "libel" and inserting "in all criminal cases" after the word "right."
REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 65, at 1389. The section as proposed would then read:

"In all prosecutions for libel [as with any criminal so with any civil case], the truth of the
matter alleged to be libelous may be given in justification, and the jury shall have the right
[in all criminal cases] to determine the law and the facts." Id.
6At the time of the 1850 Constitutional Convention there were three reported decisions in
Indiana concerning the subject: Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (1828); Warren v. State, 4
Blackf. 150 (1836); and Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf. 247 (1836). See discussion infra at
Section Il.
69 REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 65, at 1389.
70JOURNAL, supra note 60, at 579.
71 REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supranote 65, at 2066-61; see also KETTLEBOROUGH, supra note 39,
at 297.
2
7 KETLEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at 421.
73KErLEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at 425.
- 2 Blackf. 151 (Ind. 1828).
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advisory only. Noting that this question was one which "has been
frequently agitated in this state," 5 the court in a lengthy opinion
admitted that Article 1, Section 10 gives the jury the right to determine
the law in cases of libel, but did not do so for any other case. 76 There was
a sole dissenting opinion written by Justice Blackford, who expressed the
view that "although the opinion of the Court, on the questions of law
applicable to the facts proved, is entitled to great deference and respect
from the jury, it is not absolutely compulsory upon them."" His view
prevailed eight years later when the issue was again raised in Warren v.
State.78 In a four-sentence opinion authored by Justice Blackford, the
supreme court reversed the defendant's larceny conviction, because the
trial court refused to instruct the jury that they were the judges of the
79
law as well as the facts.

Id. at 182.
The court's acknowledgment that under the 1816 Constitution the jury is the judge of the
law in cases of libel seems to be grudging at best. The argument the court advanced in
support of its position that no such power existed in other cases applied equally to cases of
libel. For example, the court indicated:
In no case can the Court decide upon an issue in fact, unless by express
statutory provision; nor can the jury in any case determine an issue of
law. The Court must take the facts to be, as found by the jury; and the
jury must yield to the law as delivered by the Court.... [Juries] neither
have, nor are presumed to have, a competent knowledge to decide
according to any tettled principles; and being so frequently succeeded
by each other, it would be impossible, in any future time, to establish
any permanent rules of decision.
Id. at 158-59. Continuing the court held:
It appears to us to be dear, that although the jury has an
unquestionable right to find a general verdict, and in that verdict they
may, if they choose to violate their oaths, find contrary to law, or
contrary to the direction of the Court, yet in so doing they have passed
the proper boundary of their duty.
Id. at 160.
77 Id. at 163 (Blackford, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)(emphasis in the
original).
78 4 Blackf. 150 (1836).
79The full text of the opinion is as follows:
Indictment for larceny. Plea, not guilty. Verdict and judgment for the
State. After the evidence on both sides was closed, the defendant
below asked the Court to instruct the jury they were the judges of the
law as well as of the facts in the cause, which instruction the Court
refused to give. We think that the Court ought to have given the
instruction required, and that their refusal to do so renders the
judgment erroneous... .The judgement is reversed and the verdict set
aside. Cause remanded.
7
76
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In 1851, the same year the new constitution was adopted, the
supreme court in Carter v. State8 once again addressed the question of
the jury's role in criminal cases. Although the new constitution had not
been put to the voters for ratification by the time of the decision,81 the
court mentioned neither the 1851 nor the 1816 Constitution. In any
event, the court ruled that an instruction advising jurors that they were
the judges of the law and the facts, but that it was their duty to believe
the law as laid down by the court, represented a correct statement of the
law. The court held that "it is unnecessary for us to enter upon an
elaborate argument and review of authorities on this question to
vindicate our conclusion." 82 Referring to neither Townsend nor Warren
but citing two cases from foreign jurisdictions, the court commented
"everything is said upon the subject that needs be said, and the whole
current of decision is almost unbroken on the point."83 In 1855 the
supreme court decided four cases all, of which reaffirmed the position
the court had taken in Carter.84 Starting in 1857, the court began to break
with its prior holdings and to look anew at the 1851 Constitution. In
Lynch v. State,8 the supreme court was confronted with the issue of the
right of counsel to argue questions of law to the jury. Rejecting Carter
and referring to Callender'sCase,86 the court held that:

Id. at 150-51. A few months later the supreme court decided Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf.
247 (1836). Commenting on the trial judge's failure to give defendant's tendered
instruction advising the jury that they were the judges of the law as well as the facts and
citing Warren, the court declared "[tihis instruction ought to have been given." Id. at 249.
- 2 Ind.617 (1851).
BICarterwas decided in the May term of 1851; the constitution was submitted for vote by
the electorate in August, 1851. See KErTLEBOROUGH, supra note 39, at 421.

SUCarter, 2 Ind. at 619.
aid.
84
Murphy v. State, 6 Ind.490, 491 (1855) (stating that "the court is charged with the duty of
giving the law to the jury"); Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, 330-31 (1855) (approving an
instruction advising the jury "the jury have a right to determine the law and the facts, but it
is the duty of the Court to instruct the jury.what the law is."); Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332, 334
(1855) (pointing out that "it is the duty of the Courts, in every case arising before them for
decision, to decide and declare the law governing the case."); Driskell v. State, 7 Ind. 338,
344 (1855) (approving the following instruction: "[Ifn this and all criminal cases, the jury
has a right to judge of the law and the facts; but it is the duty of the Court to instruct them
as to what the law is, and it is proper for them to respect and take for law what the Court
declares it to be.")
9 Ind. 541 (1857)
86 United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). Circuit Justice
Samuel Chase prohibited defense counsel, William Wirt, from arguing to the jury the
unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act. Justice Chase was later impeached for his overall
handling of Callenderand upon an accusation that, among other things, in the treason trial
of John Fries, Justice Chase usurped the function of the jury by denying them the right to
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taking the constitution and [the relevant] statute
together, it would seem that the Court instructs juries in
criminal cases, not to bind their consciences, but to
inform their judgments; and while great deference
would naturally be paid by the jury to the opinion of the
judge, or judges, still it cannot be said that they are in
duty bound to adopt it as their own.87
A year later the supreme court decided Williams v. State,88 in which the
trial court gave the following instruction: "[Y]ou are the exclusive
judges of the evidence, and may determine the law; but it is as much
your duty to believe the law as to be as charged to you by the Court, as it
is your sworn duty to determine the evidence." 89 On review, the
supreme court rejected the notion that the jury was bound by the law as
given to them by the trial court. The court acknowledged Townsend,
Carter, and other common law both in this country and in England that
supported the proposition contained in the trial court's instruction. The
court observed, however:
[Tihe question before us does not rest upon common law
rule. The constitution (Art. 1, § 19) says: 'In all criminal
cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts.' Hence, it will at once
be seen that the jury, in the cases to which the section
refers, are now at liberty to settle the law for themselves;
and the result is, that an instruction of the Court in any
degree tending to impair their right, so to determine the
law, would be objectionable.9
In Daily v. State,91 decided the same year as Williams, the supreme
court underscored the jury's power and authority under the new
constitution. The court observed that the right of the jury in criminal
cases to determine the law as well as the facts was the subject of long and
earnest controversy in England and evolved out of less than honest and
impartial judges supporting despotic governments. Suggesting that the

decide the law. See Scheflin, supra note 7, at 176; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1191 (1991).
87 Lynch, 9 Ind. at 542-43.
10 Ind. 503 (1858).
1
8Id.
90Id. at505.
9110 Ind. 536 (1858).
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facts underlying the British origins of the right of juries to determine the
law may no longer exist, and implying that no such facts have ever
existed in America, the court held:
This right-whether wisely or not, in the changed
condition of things, it is not for us to say-has been
secured to juries in this state by the constitution. Juries
here, in criminal cases, have a right to determine the
facts proved, and the law arising upon those facts,
independently of instructions from the Court, in cases
where they acquit, but not where they convict. 92
For the next three quarters of a century the application of Article 1,
Section 19 as set forth in Lynch, Williams, and Daily prevailed in the State
of Indiana. Initially, there was vacillation on whether the jury's right to
determine the law included allowing the jury access to legal treatises and
statutes during their deliberation.9 There was also disagreement over
whether the new constitution meant that the jury had the sole or
exclusive authority to determine the law. 94 Otherwise, the supreme
court was fairly consistent in affirming the jury's expanded role under
the 1851 Constitution. For example, the supreme court ruled the
provision meant that the trial court's instructions were advisory only,95

92 Id.

at 538; accordRubricht v. State, 11 Ind.540 (1858).
93See, e.g., Newkirk v. State, 27 Ind. 1, 3 (1866) (holding that it was error for bailiff to
provide jurors with copy of legal treatise during their deliberations and that:
It is true that the constitution makes the jury the judges of both the law
and the facts in criminal cases, but they must receive their knowledge
of both in a proper manner during the trial....
If the jury disagree as to
the charge of the court, or upon any question of law arising in the case,
they may ask for further instructions to be given by the judge in open
court, but they cannot be furnished with common law authorities for
their own perusal)....
Jones v. State, 89 Ind. 82 (1883) (holding that it was error for bailiff to provide jurors with a
copy of Indiana Reports during their deliberations); Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 66-67
(1886) (holding that it was no error in providing jury with annotated copy of the revised
statutes during deliberations).
" See McCarthy v. State, 56 Ind. 203, 206 (1877) (ruling that in a criminal case the jury "are
now the exclusive judges of the law as well as the evidence."); Anderson v. State, 104 Ind.
467, 477 (1885) (stating that "[t]his provision [Art. 1 § 19 ] evidently means that the jury
have the right to determine all questions of law applicable to such matters.. .but can not be
rightfully construed to mean that the jury are the sole judges of the law in every respect in
a criminal cause.")
95McDonald v. State, 63 Ind.544, 546 (1878) (stating that it is erroneous in any criminal case
to advise the jury that it must be governed by the court's instructions); Hudelson v. State,
94 Ind. 426 (1883) (holding that the court's instructions are advisory, not binding, upon the
jury); Nuzum v. State, 88 Ind. 599, 600 (1883) (stating that "[ilt is the duty of the court to
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and that under its law determining function the jury was bound neither
by the trial court's instructions nor by decisions of the supreme court.96
That the jury was not so bound did not mean, however, that it could
decide cases based on a whim. Rather the inference from these early
cases is that the jury was just as knowledgeable of the law as the
presiding judge. As a result, the jury was bound to apply the law as they
knew and understood it to be. They simply were not bound to apply the
law as the trial judge knew or understood it to be. This theme was best
expressed in the case of Blaker v. State,97 in which the Indiana Supreme
Court approved of an instruction advising the jury:
You, gentlemen, in this case, are the judges of the law as
well as of the facts. You can take the law as given and
explained to you by the court, but, if you see fit, you
have the legal and constitutional right to reject the same,
and construe it for yourselves. 98
However, the court was emphatic in admonishing that "[tihe
Constitution gives to juries in criminal cases the right to determine the
law as well as the facts. It does not, however, give to them the right to
disregardthe law." 99

instruct you in the law, but his instructions are advisory only, and you may disregard his
instructions and determine the law for yourselves"); Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663 (1893)
(approving an instruction that informed the jury that it was the duty of the court to instruct
it as to the law of the case but, that such instructions were merely advisory, and that it had
the
right to disregard them and determine the law for itself).
9
6Keiser v. State, 83 Ind.234, 236 (1882) (stating that.
[I]n a criminal case the jury is the ultimate judge of the law as well as
the facts, and it is therefore error to instruct that they must be
governed by the decisions of the supreme court... If such juries,
conscientiously believing the law to be [different than decisions of the
supreme court] may not follow their convictions, but are bound, as an
absolute duty, to be governed by the decisions of the supreme court,
then the constitutional provision is a dead letter);
accord Fowler v. State, 85 Ind. 538 (1882).
130 Ind. 203 (1891).
9 Id. at 204.
" Id. (emphasis in the original). Although this theme was prevalent, at least one opinion
during the period disapproved of an instruction advising the jury that they had a right to
reject the court's instruction only if they could say upon their oath that "they know the law
better than the Court itself" or that the jury was "better qualified to judge the law than the
court." The instruction was found to be in conflict with the jury's right to determine the
law by imposing a restriction on the jury not contemplated by the Constitution. See
Schuster v. State, 178 Ind.320, 323 (1912).
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During the 1920s and 1930s, the Indiana Supreme Court began to
refine its views of the jury's role under Article 1, Section 19. It declared,
for example, that the provision did not extend to questions concerning
the admissibility of evidence; 10° that the jury's law determining function
did not include a right to make law; 10 1 that the jury was bound to give
supreme court decisions highest respect; 10 2 the constitutional provision
did not mean the jury had the right to fix punishment for crimes; 1o0 and
that the law the jury had the right to determine was existing law as
found in the statutes of the State.1 4 During this same period, the court
began also to vacillate in its view on the extent to which the jury had a
right to disregard the instructions of the trial court. On the one hand, the
supreme court approved instructions informing the jury that the trial
court's instructions were not designed to bind their conscience, but to
enlighten their judgment; and that if the jury had no well-defined
opinion as to what the law was, then it was their duty to give the
instructions of the court their respectful consideration. l s On the other
hand, the Court found no error with instructions advising the jury that it
may not "judge the law as they think it should be." 1°6 The conflicting
opinions during this period began to show a gradual erosion from the
view advanced in Lynch, Williams, and Daily.1° 7 Finally, in 1957 the
100
Harlan v. State, 190 Ind. 322 (1920); Sprague v. State, 203 Ind. 581 (1932). This particular
declaration reaffirmed a view actually taken earlier in Ruse v. State, 115 N.E. 778 (1917).
101Hubbard v. State, 196 Ind. 137 (1925).
102Trainer v. State, 198 Ind.502 (1926).
10 Mack v. State, 205 Ind. 355 (1932).
104Hamilton v. State, 207 Ind.97 (1934).
105Cunacoff v. State, 193 Ind. 62, 63 (Ind.1922); see also Chesterfield v. State, 194 Ind. 282,
297 (1923) (holding that it was no error in the trial court giving instruction which advised
the jury that "they could not disregard the law, but were to determine what it was; they
could reject the court's instructions as to the law and determine it for themselves, but that
they should weigh the instructions as they weighed the evidence and disregard neither
without proper reason."); Hubbard v. State, 196 Ind.137 (1925) (holding that it was error to
give instructions in criminal case which seek to bind the conscience of the jury by imposing
restrictions not imposed by the Constitution); Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 380 (1933)
(ruling "[t]he jury in its deliberation may consider the Constitution, the common law, the
statutes, the decisions of courts of last resort, the instructions of the court, and the
argument of counsel and determine the law for themselves").
106Wolfe v. State, 200 Ind. 557, 569 (1928); accord Hamilton v. State, 207 Ind. 97 (1934). See
also Cole v. State, 192 Ind. 29, 37 (1921) (ruling that the trial court properly refused an
instruction defining an offense not supported by the evidence and declared:
a jury may have the power to stultify itself by returning a verdict
contrary to what it knew to be the law, since the jurisdiction to decide
includes power to decide wrong. But the court, when giving
instructions, is not required to insult the jurors by a suggestion that
they may do so).
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Supreme Court decided Beavers v. State,108 putting to rest any notion that
the jury's authority under Article 1, Section 19 included the authority to
disregard trial court instructions.
Defendant Beavers tendered an instruction which provided that the
jury was the "exclusive" judge of the law and that although the trial
court had the duty to instruct the jury as to the law, the jury had a right
to disregard the trial court's instructions and to determine for themselves
the law governing the case. The trial court gave its own instruction
rejecting the instruction tendered by the defendant. 1°9 On appeal the
defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in so
doing. In the first case in nearly a century to discuss the matter in any
depth, the supreme court reviewed the historical development of Article
1, Section 19 and settled upon a construction that has remained largely
unmodified to date. Quoting with approval the description of Article 1,
Section 19 as an "outmoded relic," the court declared the notion that a

107Commenting that for "seventy five years this provision has been throwing confusion
into the administration of criminal justice" at least one author proposed submitting to the
1926 Indiana General Assembly a constitutional amendment "strik[ing] out" Article 1,
Section 19. Jones J. Robinson, Proposalsfor the Improvement of the Administrationof Criminal
Justice in Indiana,2 IND. L.J. 217,224 (1926).
M0141 N.E.d 118 (Ind. 1957).
109The trial court's instruction is reproduced below.
The constitution of this state makes the jury the judge of the law as
well as the facts. But this does not mean that the jurors may wilfully
and arbitrarily disregard the law, nor that they make and judge the
law as they think it should be in any particular case. It means that the
jurors, under their oaths, should honestly, justly and impartially judge
the law as it exists, and as it is found upon the statutes of our state, in
each particular case. It does not mean that the jurors may so judge the
law in any case as to make it null and void and of no force, but that
they shall so judge the laws as to give them a fair and honest
interpretation, to the end and to the effect that each and every law, in
each and every case, may be fairly and honestly enforced. Any other
interpretation of the law would weaken the safeguards erected by
society for its protection; for by the non-enforcement of the law and its
penalties in all criminal cases where it is shown by the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have been violated, contempt for the
law is bred among the very class that it is intended to restrain. The
facts must be so judged and found by the jury from a careful
consideration of all the testimony given by the witnesses in the case,
and under your oaths, you have no right to arbitrarily disregard either
the law or the facts in the case, without just cause, after a fair and
impartial consideration of both.
Beavers, 141 N.E.2d at 120-21.
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jury may determine the law in criminal cases was an "archaic
constitutional provision" and an "anachronistic doctrine." 10
Approving the trial court's instruction, the supreme court first
dispelled the idea that the jury is the exclusive judge of the law in
criminal cases. It reasoned that the Indiana Constitution also vests
judicial power in the courts of this State, which includes determinations
of law. Thus, if the jury were the exclusive judges of the law, there
would exist an irreconcilable conflict between the two constitutional
provisions. The court also reasoned the jury could not be considered the
exclusive judge of the law, because as a matter of practice, judges in
criminal cases determine procedural matters, including the law relating
to the admissibility of evidence. As for the jury disregarding the
instructions of the trial court and determining the law for itself, the court
declared:
The average juryman, being uninformed as to the law
should not be left in a vacuum without obligation, duty,
or conscience controlling him-left entirely to some whim
or prejudice in the determination of the law. He should
look to the court for advice and guidance in reaching a
determination in such constitutional function. He is
seeking to reach a correct determination from the best
sources available of both the law and the facts in a
criminal case. In attempting to reach a determination of
the facts in the case in the performance of his
constitutional function, he listens to the witnesses and
the evidence. In reaching a determination of the law he
should likewise listen to the court in the performance of
that constitutional duty."'
Apparently responding to the inference raised in earlier cases that jurors
had better knowledge of the law than the trial judge, the supreme court
declared "[n]o honest and intelligent jury would, upon reflection, say
that by their study and experience they were better qualified to judge of
the law than the court."112 Without actually defining the jury's law
determining function, the court went on to say "[t]he right to determine

110Id. at 125.
M Id. at 123.
1121d. at 121.
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the law, whether it be done by the court or jury, is not the right to make,
113
repeal, disregard, or ignore the law in all its phases."
Article 1, Section 19 did not again receive comprehensive attention
by the supreme court until 1967,114 when it decided the case of Pritchard
v. State.115 There the court clarified Beavers, emphasizing that the case
did not stand for the proposition that the trial court was permitted to
give juries mandatory instructions that bound their minds and
consciences to return a verdict of guilty upon the finding of certain
facts. 116 Also, reacting to comments made in Beavers, the court observed:
If to some it appears that Art. I, § 19 is an "outmoded
relic," is "archaic", or is "anachronistic," (views in which
we do not necessarily concur) then there is a very clear
method for amending our Constitution which they may
pursue. For the moment, however, we are governed by
the general rule that constitutional provisions are to be
liberally construed as they stand. We may not, under
the guise of judicial interpretation, accomplish a
constitutional amendment by judicial fiat, nor are we
inclined to do so.
It appears to this Court that Art. I, § 19 taken in
connection with the presumption of innocence is far
from an outmoded, archaic, anachronism.
Rather,
despite its venerable age, it appears to be in the
vanguard of modern thinking with regard to the full
protection of the rights of the criminal defendant.1 17
Notwithstanding its clarification of and reaction to comments made in
Beavers, the Pritchardcourt approved the instruction given by the trial
court, referring to it as a general guideline "provid[ing] criteria for the
jury in its approach to its serious duties in the trial of a criminal
cause." 118 The court also reaffirmed the view that a defendant in a
Id. at 124.
year earlier the court decided Minton v. State, 214 N.E.2d 380 (1966). Without citing
Beavers the court approved an instruction similar to the one given in Beavers and concluded
that the instruction did not violate the jury's constitutional right to determine the law.
11

114 A

's230 N.E.2d 416 (Ind.1967).

116Id. at 421.

17Id. It should be noted that Justice Arterburn, the author of the Beavers opinion, dissented
in Pritchard.
118Id. at 419.
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criminal case was not entitled to an instruction advising the jury that it
may disregard the law and determine the law as it sees fit.119
The underlying principles set forth in Beavers and the instruction
approved in the case were reaffirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court for
the next two decades. 120 In the 1980s the court once again began to
vacillate in its view concerning the jury's role under Article 1, Section 19.
Within months of the court having approved as a correct statement of
the law an instruction nearly verbatim to the one approved in Beavers,121
the court was confronted with an instruction that provided in part:
The Instructions of the Court are advisory only, and you
may disregard them entirely and determine what the
law is for yourselves; and, if you find that any
instruction does not, or that any instructions do not state
the law correctly, it is your.. .duty to decide the case
according to the law as you shall find it to be.
f, however, you shall have no well defined opinion as to
what the law is relating to any particular matter or
matters in issue in this case, then, in determining the
law, you should give the instructions of the Court
respectful consideration. 122
The defendant complained the instruction gave the jury an option to
disregard the law entirely. Quoting Beavers at length, the court held the
instruction was properly given. Six years later a defendant tendered an
identical instruction, which the trial court denied. 123 Acknowledging
that the instruction was "proper," the supreme court found no error

119ld. at 420.
i2 See, e.g., Drake v. State, 397 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ind. 1979) (although jury has the right to
determine the law, "it is to do so under the guidance of the trial judge"); Holliday v. State,
257 N.E.2d 679, 682 (Ind. 1970) (holding that it was no error in that portion of trial court's
instruction advising the jury "for by the non-enforcement of the law and its penalties in all
criminal cases where it is shown by the evidence to have been violated, contempt for the
law is bred among the very class that it is intended to restrain"); Parker v. State, 185 N.E.2d
727, 728 (id. 1962) (holding that it was no error in that portion of the trial court's
instruction advising jury it must "judge the law as it exists, and as it is found upon the
statutes of our State, in each particular case").
121Norton v. State, 408 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1980).
122Cobb v. State, 412 N.E.2d 728, 741 (Ind. 1980).
3 Travis v. State, 488 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1986).
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because the substance of the instruction was contained in other
instructions given by the trial court. 124
This brief journey into what appeared to be a return to the Lynch,
Williams, and Dailey construction of Article 1, Section 19 was short lived.
In 1987, the supreme court found no error in the following instruction:
[s]ince this is a criminal case the Constitution of the State
of Indiana makes you the judges of both the law and the
facts. Though this means that you are to determine the
law for yourself, it does not mean that you have the
right to make, repeal, disregard, or ignore the law as it
exists. The instructions of the court are the best source
as to the law applicable to this case. 125
Over the appellant's complaint that the instruction was contrary to the
plain language of the Indiana Constitution, the supreme court declared
that the instruction correctly stated the law. Nearly identical instructions
were approved by the court thereafter. 2 6 In 1989 the court reiterated
that the trial judge's instructions are not "advisory only," 127 and in 1994,
the latest opportunity the supreme court has taken to speak on the
matter, the court cited Beavers for the proposition that "[Ilt is improper
for a court to instruct a jury that they have a right to disregard the
law....Notwithstanding Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution,
a jury has no more right to ignore the law than it has to ignore the facts
128
in a case."
III. CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Under its current construction Article 1, Section 19 has been
rendered a nullity. The provision itself is really a model of simplicity:
"In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine
the law and the facts." The practice in Indiana is that in criminal cases
an instruction is given either using the exact words of the Constitution or
words importing the same meaning. On some occasions, the term "to

124Id. at 346. Curiously the appellant did not cite Cobb v. State, 412 N.E. 2d 728 (Ind.1980);
rather he cited Smith v. State, 312 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), a Court of Appeals
opinion decided years earlier which had approved a similar instruction.
25
1 Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ind.1987).
126See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.1988); Andrews v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1159
(Ind.1989); Armstead v. State, 538 N.E.2d 943 (Ind.1989).
127Canaan v. State, 541 N.E.2d 894,910 (Ind.1989).
128 Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928,946 (Ind.1994).
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judge" is used instead of the term "to determine." In any event, after the
constitutional advisory is given, it is followed by modifying language.
Although instructions often are worded differently from case to case, a
typical instruction provides:
Since this is a criminal case the Constitution of the State
of Indiana makes you the judges of both the law and the
facts. Though this means that you are to determine the
law for yourself, it does not mean that you have the
right to make, repeal, disregard, or ignore the law as it
exists. The instructions of the court are the best source
as to the law applicable to this case. 129
In giving the instruction, the trial court will generally have refused a
similar instruction tendered by the defendant. On other occasions there
is only an objection to the instruction without the defendant submitting
an instruction of his own. In either event, the challenge on review
centers on the modifying language. Responding to the challenge, the
supreme court does not always speak with a clear and consistent voice.
Nonetheless, the underlying premises of Beavers remains the same,
namely: the jury is bound by the law as given to them by the trial court
which they have no power to make, repeal, alter, or ignore.
12 Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ind.1987) (citing Beavers with approval and holding

that "[l]anguage similar to that contained in this instruction has been approved in the
past....We see no reason to interfere with existing precedent.") As recently as 1995 the
Court of Appeals of Indiana approved the following instruction noting a virtually identical
instruction was approved in Beavers:
While the constitution of this state makes the jurors the judges of the
law as well as the facts, this does not mean that the jurors may
willfully and arbitrarily disregard the law.
It means that jurors under their oaths should honestly, justly and
impartially judge the law as it exists. It does not mean that jurors may
so judge the law in any case so as to make it null and void and of no
force, but that they shall so judge the law as to give it a fair and honest
interpretation, to the end that the law in each and every case may be
fairly and honestly enforced.
Any other interpretation of the law would weaken the safeguards
erected by society for its protection; for by the non-enforcement of the
law and its penalties in all criminal cases where it is shown by the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have been violated, contempt
for the law is bred among the very class that it is intended to restrain.
The facts must be judged and found by the jury from a careful
consideration of all the testimony given by the witnesses in the case,
and under your oaths you have no right to arbitrarily disregard either
the law of the facts in the case.
Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131,135 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995).
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The central elements of the Beavers rationale seem to comport with
common sense: (1) the jury is bound by the law as given them by the trial
judge, and (2) there are limits on the jury's law determining function. As
to the former, the practice of permitting the jury to determine the law
developed in part because judges were not professionally trained. 3°
They were no more likely to know the law than the jury summoned to
hear the case. Consequently, the jury had the right to decide for
themselves the law applicable in a particular case.1 31 Even after the time
in which judges began to become professionally trained,13 2 the practice
continued of allowing juries to determine the law for themselves based
on their own knowledge of the law.133 Because the underlying rationale
for the practice no longer exists, at least in terms of untrained criminal
trial court judges, its continued validity is suspect.
Commenting on Indiana's constitutional scheme, one writer
observed that the supposed right of a jury to determine the law "is
dangerous to the defendant and the public alike, and detrimental to the
orderly administration of justice. Jurors obviously do not know the law,
other than as given them by the court. It is difficult to perceive how a
theory which assumes they do can be justified." 134 This view is
consistent with the criticism that allowing a jury to determine the law as
well as the facts permits them to apply any concept of law they see fit to
a particular case and thus amounts to a deprivation of due process of law
under the United States Constitution. 135 It is also consistent with the
"serious concern.. .that under Article 1, Section 19 of the Constitution of
Indiana, the jury has the right to find a person guilty who should be
acquitted." 136 However, under current rules of procedure the trial judge
is free to direct a verdict of acquittal, set aside a conviction, or grant a
new trial where the verdict is contrary to law or against the weight of the

130Howe,

supra note 28, at 591.

131Id.

at 584.
132"By the early 1900's nearly every state required all active judges, except municipal court
judges and justices of the peace, to have some legal training." Betty Barteau, Thirty Years of
the Journey of Indiana Women Judges 1964-1994,30 IND. L. REv. 43,46 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Schuster v. State, 178 Ind. 320 (1912).
13 John F. Bodle, Criminal Law-Indiana Juries in Criminal Cases As Judges of Law Under
ConstitutionalRelic, 24 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 365,366 (1948).
135 See, e.g., Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 (4 t h Cir. 1967)
(rejecting a similar argument attacking on federal constitutional grounds Article 15, Section
5 of the Constitution of Maryland which reads "[in the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury
shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction").
'mPritchard, 230 N.E.2d at 421.
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evidence. 137 The appellate courts also have the power to review a
conviction for sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, the system itself
accommodates any fear that a jury would act with vengeance rather than
mercy. There is no question that the jury's authority over issues of law
poses the potential risk that an innocent defendant will be found guilty.
However, the potential risk is outweighed by the actual benefit of
allowing the jury to acquit on the basis conscience.
As for limiting the jury's law determining function, it is hardly
justified to suppose that the jury has the right to make or repeal the law.
Indiana's constitutional scheme, like that of most states and the federal
government, provides a system of checks and balances dividing power
among three coequal branches of government. The Indiana Constitution
anticipates that law making authority, at least in the form of statutory
138
enactments, rests with citizens duly elected to the Legislature.
Concurrent with the authority to make the law, attendant with open
debate, and considerations of public policy, is the authority to amend the
law or to abolish it by repeal. It is illogical and inconsistent with
democratic governance to suppose that twelve ordinary citizens, elected
by no one, would possess the right to dismantle the results of the
legislative process or to engage in that process themselves during the
course of deliberations in a criminal trial.
Although there are limitations on the jury's law determining
function, Article 1, Section 19 gives the jury that function nonetheless.
Ruling that the jury is bound by the law as given to them by the trial
court which the jury has no right to make, repeal, disregard or ignore,
leaves open the question: what is there about the law that the jury has
the constitutional right to determine? The Indiana Supreme Court has
not definitively answered the question.
In many instances jury
instructions avoid the question altogether, simply defining the jury's
right in terms of what it may not do.139 On other occasions, the

137d. (holding that "[a] trial court has an inherent power and duty by granting a motion
for a new trial, to correct a 'runaway' verdict which would convict an innocent man. And if
that court fails in its responsibility, [a court of review] has the same power and duty on
appeal").
3
1 8 See IND. CONST., art. IV, § 1 (1850) (providing that "[tlhe legislative authority of the State
shall be vested in the General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives...; and no law shall be enacted, except by bill"). See also IND. CONST., art.
IV, § 25 (1850) (providing that "[a] majority of all members elected to each House, shall be
necessary to pass every bill or joint resolution; and all bills and joint resolutions so passed,
shall be signed by the Presiding Officers of the respective Houses").
M See, e.g., Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. 1987).
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instructions attempt to respond to the question by advising the jury that
to "determine the law" or to "judge the law" means that "jurors under
their oaths, should honestly, justly and impartially judge the law as it
exists." 140 In essence, to determine the law means to determine law. But
obviously this is no answer. The instructions make clear that the existing
law is the law given to the jury by the trial court "and consists of the
constitution, the statutes, and common law as stated in the decisions of
the Supreme Court" 141 which the jury has no right to make, repeal,
disregard, or ignore. Adherence to such a rule effectively removes the
jury from any law deciding or law determining function. After all, the
law is whatever the judge says it is. As a result, the jury is relegated to
the more traditional role of fact-finder leaving to the court matters of
law. The problem, however, is that this view in not consistent with the
text of Article 1, Section 19.
IV.

APPLYING THE RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Unlike other provisions of the Indiana Bill of Rights, the right of the
jury to determine the law in criminal cases has never received serious
constitutional analysis. 142 When a claim is raised on review challenging
the instruction of a trial court as denying the jury's right, the typical
response is that it either does or does not violate Article 1, Section 19.
Even Beavers,143 the case most often cited for the proposition that the jury
is bound by the instructions of the trial court and has no right under the
Constitution to disregard the instructions, does not reach that conclusion
through an analytical constitutional framework. Beavers does refer
briefly to the possible common law origins of the rule, but beyond that
there is no analysis.
One of the more recent opportunities the supreme court has taken to
analyze a provision of the Indiana Bill of Rights occurred in the case of
Price v. State.'" In the context of a citizen confronting a police officer
with abusive language, the court examined the boundaries Article 1,
Section 9 of Indiana's Constitution, the provision protecting freedom of
expression, imposed on the State's disorderly conduct statute. The court
140
See, e.g., Cobb v. State, 412 N.E.2d 728,741 (Ind.1980).
141
See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 141 N.E.2d 118,122 (Ind.1956).
1 See e.g. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994) (Privileges and Immunities Clause, art.
1, § 23); Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind.1994) (Search and Seizure Clause, art. 1, § 11);
Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993) (Free Speech and Writing Clause, art. 1, § 9); Miller
v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987) (Confrontation Clause, art. 1, § 13).
143
Beavers v. State, 141 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
144
622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993).
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began its examination by noting the general framework of its approach:
"Interpretation of the Indiana Constitution is controlled by the text itself,
illuminated by history and by the purpose and structure of our
constitution and the case law surrounding it."145 This approach is in line

with authority that dictates that the task of interpreting a particular
provision of the Indiana Constitution includes a "search for the common
46
understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it."1
In a further refinement of its approach the court relied upon a concept
that it characterized as "core values." Although somewhat amorphous,
the concept embraces the general analytical scheme used to assess
provisions of Indiana's Constitution. Specifically, the court indicated
"[t]here is within each provision of our Bill of Rights a cluster of essential
values which the legislature may qualify but not alienate....A right is
impermissibly alienated when the State materially burdens one of the
core values which it embodies." 147 In determining what core values give
life to a particular constitutional guarantee, the court looks to "the
purpose for which the guarantee was adopted and the history of
Indiana's constitutional scheme." 148 Noting the lack of debate on the Bill
of Rights generally, the court proceeded to review the historical context
in which Article 9 was adopted, including comments on the composition
of the 1850 Convention and reliance on period dictionaries in an effort to
discern what the framers and citizens of the time may have meant by the
term "abuse" as the term appears in Section 9.149
When the methodology advanced in Price is applied to Article 1,
Section 19, there is room for an interpretation of the provision which is
substantially different from that of the current view. As the Price court
correctly observed, "in 1850, when the populist, anti-government
Jacksonian Democrats turned their eye towards constitutional revision,
the Bill of Rights captured only modest attention."1 50 The underlying
reasons for this modest attention are unclear, 151 but the delegates did
expand the Bill of Rights from that which existed under the 1816 version
of the Constitution.15 2 That the delegates were largely representative of
14 Id.at 957

(citing State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind.1988)).

146Bayh v. Sonneburg, 573 N.E.2d 398,412 (Ind.1991).

14Price,522 N.E.2d at 960.
148Id. at 961.
149Id.

150Id. at 962.
t51 The Price court observed that the reasons "likely reflected the twin facts that the 1816
version was already essentially populist in character, and that the threat to popular,
republican government in Indiana had largely evaporated." Id.
2
1 MADISON, supra note 35, at 140.
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Jacksonian Democrats is instructive.
Andrew Jackson's brand of
democracy was characterized by a "fear of governmental power" and a
"faith in the people." 153 Shortly before leaving the presidency in 1837,
Jackson warned "[a]U history tells us that a free people should be
watchful of delegated power, and should never acquiesce in a practice
that will diminish their control over it."' 54 It was the spirit of Jacksonian
democracy that prevailed at the Convention. It is true there was
virtually no debate on the adoption of Section 19.155 Nonetheless,
delegate Thornton's comment on the jury's "well settled" right to decide
upon questions of law and fact in criminal cases is revealing. 156 To be
sure the statement that the law was "well settled" was a bit of an
exaggeration.
The case authority in Indiana at the time was
conflicting, 157 and the issue had been fiercely debated throughout the
country.'58 Still, none of the 56 lawyers attending the convention
challenged the assertion, and the doctrine had been firmly established in
15 9
a number of jurisdictions by the time of the 1850 convention.
Unlike many jurisdictions, Indiana spoke of the jury's authority in
terms of its right "to determine" the law rather than "to judge" the law.
However, this distinction appears to be one more of form than substance.
The language was apparently an adaptation from the earlier 1816
Constitution, which declared in part "in all indictments for libels, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the
direction of the court, as in other cases." 160 This wording, in turn, was
nearly identical to provisions of the Sedition Act of 1798, at which time
the term was used in the context of the jury deciding questions of law for
themselves. 161 Further, since enactment of the provision, there has never

153Richard E. Ellis, Andrew Jackson, States' Rights, and Minority Rule, reprinted in CHARLES
McCURDY, GRADUATE PROGRAM FOR JUDGES-AMERIcAN CONSTrUrIONAL HISTORY PART I
317 (1996).
154
Id. at 316.
1s See generally infra Section I.B.
I5 6 REPORT OF THE DEBATES, supranote 65, at 1389.
I-7 See Townsend v. State, 2 Black 151 (1828); Warren v. State, 4 Black 150 (1836); Armstrong
v. State, 4 Black 247 (1836).
Is8 Seegenerally Spark v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
159See infra Section I.A.
I6 JOURNAL, supra note 60, at 187 (emphasis added).
161 During debate on the Act, William Claiborne of Tennessee offered an amendment that
would have made it clear that in all cases of libel the jury "shall be judges of the law as well
as the facts" in order to avoid the perils of the English libel laws. Robert Harper of South
Carolina replied "there could be no need of such amendment. It was well known that, in
this country, the jury were always judges of the law as well as the facts, in libels, as well as
in every other case." Howe, supranote 28, at 586.
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been a dispute over whether the term embraces the concept that the jury
are judges of the law. The cases show that the courts have used
interchangeably the term "to judge" with "to determine." Rather the
debate has been joined over the parameters of the jury's authority in the
law determining/law judging process.
Even though the law on the question of the jury's right to judge or to
determine the law was not well settled, it may be reasonably presumed
that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention intended an
expanded role for criminal juries.
Importantly, the fundamental
interpretation of the doctrine, in those jurisdictions that embraced it, was
the right of the jury to disregard the instructions of the trial court. 162 In
1850 Indiana, citizen distrust of governmental authority may have been
less acute than that which existed prior to the Revolution. Nonetheless
Jacksonian democracy prevailed. Checking and controlling the power of
government would have been consistent with the core values of a
citizenry who had "faith in the people" and were at least suspicious if
not "fear[ful] of governmental power." Preserving to ordinary laymen
the right to determine both law and fact in criminal cases was not only
consistent with democratic governance, but also it was a widely accepted
principle.
As applied by the early courts of Indiana, the principle apparently
anticipated that ordinary laymen were just as knowledgeable of the law
as the trial judge. The cases show that little to no analysis was applied to
the rule. Rather, the rule was invoked based simply on precedent.
However, assuming the spirit of Jacksonian democracy would not have
supported a principle that presupposed ordinary laymen had just as
much knowledge of the law as a presiding judge, there are other
possibilities. The view concerning the superior knowledge of lay jurors
was only a part of the doctrine's development. Another part of the
development advances the notion that the right of the jury to disregard
the trial court's instructions had little to do with the jury disagreeing
with the trial judge over the meaning and interpretation of the law.
Rather, the jury was encouraged to decline to apply the law in spite of
the judge's instructions. The Quaker meeting before which William
Penn spoke was illegal under the Conventicle Act of 1664. The jury's
refusal to return a verdict of guilty as charged rested on its refusal to
apply the law as written.
When colonial juries released ships
impounded by the British for violating navigation acts, they did so in

162Scheflin,

supra note 7, at 168.
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defiance of the law, not because they had a different interpretation of the
law than the judge. There is no indication that Peter Zenger's acquittal
on charges of seditious libel was based on the jury's different
understanding of the law. Rather Hamilton invited the jury to disregard
the law. The jury accepted his invitation. Thus, while Beavers and its
progeny focus on one strand of the development underlying the
principle that the jury is the judge of the law and the facts, the alternative
strand has never been addressed by Indiana Courts. This alternative
view is wholly consistent with the status of the law at the time of the
1850 Convention. It is also consistent with the spirit of Jacksonian
democracy.
There is, of course, the objection that the jury may have the power to
disregard the law but not the right. In 1956 this view was expressed in
Beavers and in 1994 reemphasized by the Bivins court1 63. The problem,
however, is that such an objection is more appropriate for those
jurisdictions where the rule is solely a creature of the common law.
Differing interpretations of the common law, or even a change in-the
common law, could very well justify abolishing any supposed right the
jury may have to disregard the trial court's instructions. An illustrative
example is the State of Vermont. In the 1860 case of State v. McDonnell,164
the Supreme Court of Vermont declared that the principle that the jury
has the right to determine the law in a criminal case "is one of those
great exceptional rules intended for the security of the citizen against any
impracticable refinements in the law, or any supposable or possible
tyranny or oppression of the courts."1 65 The court continued that the rule
was
one of those great landmarks.. .which... will always be
likely to be characterized as an absurdity by the mere
advocates of logical symmetry in the law, [but which]
will nevertheless be sure in the long run, to constantly
gain ground, and become more and more firmly fixed in
the hearts and sympathies of those with whom liberty
and law are almost synonymous....,,66
Thirty-two years later, the same court, in a blistering assault, denounced
this "exceptional rule" and "great landmark" as
163

See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind.1994).

W32 Vt. 491 (1860).
l6 Id. at 531.
166Id.

at 531-32. See also Howe, supra note 28, at 593.
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contrary to the fundamental maxims of the common
law.. .contrary to the uniform practice and decisions of
the courts of Great Britain, where our jury system had its
beginnings and where it matured; contrary to the great
weight of authority in this country; contrary to the spirit
and meaning of the constitution of the United States;
[and] repugnant to the constitution of this State.... "167
This reversal of opinion had its support in the federal courts as well.
Sparf v. United States' 68 remains the leading American case concerning
the rights of the criminal jury.169 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan,
in a fifty-five-page opinion, held that in criminal cases it is the duty of
juries "to take the law from the court and apply the law to the facts as
they find them to be from the evidence." 170 In reaching the decision
Justice Harlan declared:
If it be the function of the jury to decide the law as well
as the facts-if the function of the court be only advisory
as to the law-why should the court interfere for the
protection of the accused against what it deems an error
of the jury in matter of law.
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the
principle be established that juries in criminal cases may,
of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the
court and become a law unto themselves. Under such a
system, the principal function of the judge would be to
preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the
law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or
property according to such legal principles as in their
judgment were applicable to the particular case being
tried.17'
In a dissent consisting of more than seventy pages Justice Gray, with
Justice Shiras concurring, "elaborately and painstakingly" 172 analyzed

167State v. Burgee, 25 A. 964,974 (Vt. 1892). See also Howe, supra note 28, at 593.
1M156 U.S. 51 (1895).
169Howe,

supranote 28, at 588.
U.S. at 102

170Sparf, 156
17

Id. at 101.

172Howe, supra

note 28, at 589.
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both state and federal decisions on the question of the jury's right to
judge the law and reached the contrary conclusion:
It is our deep and settled conviction, confirmed by a
reexamination of the authorities.. .that the jury, upon the
general issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case,
have the right, as well as the power, to decide, according
to their own judgment and consciences, all questions,
1 3
whether of law or of fact, involved in that issue. 7
The jury to whom the case is submitted, upon the
general issue of guilty or not guilty, are intrusted with
the decision of both the law and the facts involved in
that issue. To assist them in the decision of the facts,
they hear the testimony of witnesses; but they are not
bound to believe the testimony. To assist them in the
decision of the law, they receive the instructions of the
judge; but they are not obliged to follow his
instructions....The duty of the jury, indeed, like any
other duty imposed upon any officer or private person
by the law of his country, must be governed by the law,
and not by wilfulness or caprice.
The jury must
ascertain the law as well as they can. Usually they will,
and safely may, take it from the instructions of the court.
But, if they are satisfied on their consciences that the law
is other than as laid down to them by the court, it is their
right and their duty to decide by the law as they know
or believe it to be. 174
The concurring and dissenting opinions contain virtually every
argument that courts and lawyers had fashioned over the years in
support of or in opposition to the question of whether the jury in a
criminal case had the right to disregard the instructions of the trial court
and to decide the case on their own. Although the Sparf majority
decided against such right "more on principle than on precedent, " 175 the
issue is settled nonetheless in the federal courts. However, the thrust of
Sparf centered upon the history and development of the common law.
Even the majority acknowledged there are "jurisdictions, where juries in
criminal cases have the right, in virtue of constitutional or statutory

'7 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 114.
174
Id.
3

at 172.

1 Howe, supra note 28, at 589.
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provisions, to determine both law and facts upon their own judgment as
to what the law is... ,"176 Thus, arguments in favor of abolishing a

common law power must fail where the power is exalted to the status of
a right by virtue of constitutional entitlement.
In a criminal prosecution, the power of government is in full force.
Even the caption of the charging instrument is imposing: "The State of
Indiana v.
." The core value of checking and controlling that
power through the voice of ordinary citizens is consistent with the spirit
of Jacksonian democracy. Certainly the jury's right to determine the law
meant something to the framers. If it did not mean that the jury could
alter, abolish, or amend the law, and if it did not mean that the jury
could set aside the law on the basis of having a differing opinion of what
the law was, then what did it mean? Considering the apparent purpose
for which the provision was adopted, as informed by the history of
Indiana's constitutional scheme, one may reasonably conclude that it
means the jury has a right not to apply the law when their conscience so
dictates.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE RULES

Indiana's system of justice would no doubt be undermined if jurors
had the right to return false verdicts, even out of a sense of justice or out
of sense of what the jury thinks is right. 177 Nor would a proper
instruction under Indiana's Constitution suggest that a jury could decide
for themselves what the law is or should be. 178 But an instruction telling
the jury that the constitution intentionally allows them latitude to "refuse
to enforce the law's harshness when justice so requires" 179 would be
consistent with the intent of the framers and give life to what is now a
dead letter provision. The notion that the jury serves to temper the
harshness of the law with its own sense of justice was eloquently
articulated by Wigmore over seventy-five years ago:
We want justice, and we think we are going to get it
through 'the law' and when we do not, we blame the
law. Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in

176Sparf, 156 U.S.

at 102.

I7 For similar contention concerning United States Constitution, see James Joseph Duane,
Jury Nullification: The Top Secret ConstitutionalRight, 22 LMG. 11 (1996).
178Id.
7

1 9 Id.

at 11 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 960 (2d

ed. 1990).
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the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of
law to the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium
of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular
satisfaction is preserved.... That is what jury trial does.
It supplies that flexibility of legal rules which is essential
to justice and popular contentment. And that flexibility
could never be given by the judge trial....The jury, and
the secrecy of the jury room, are indispensable elements
in popular justice.1s
It is clear that the jury already has the unreviewable power to acquit in
the face of evidence, and a trial judge cannot direct a verdict of guilty
"no matter how overwhelming the evidence." 181 Informing the jury that
they have the right under the Indiana Constitution would do little more
than to underscore that power.
Construing Article 1, Section 19 as proposed obviously would
require a departure from current practice. The departure, however, is
not as dramatic as it may appear at first blush. An instruction advising
the jury of its constitutional right to determine the law would continue to
include the admonition that the instructions of the court are the best
source of the law in the particular case; and it would still inform the jury
that it has no right to make, amend, alter, or abolish the law. When
instructing the jury of its right to set aside the law, the court could take
the opportunity to explain carefully the significance of this awesome
liberty; that it should not be taken lightly nor exercised whimsically; but
only exercised upon a sincere and solemn belief that the justice of the
cause requires its application. Pursuing the suggested approach has the
potential of eliminating the ambiguity in instructions that essentially
inform the jury that "to determine law" means to "determine the law."
It avoids the inconsistency of not permitting the defense's argument
against the juries' law determining function, while at the same time
permitting prosecutors to urge juries to act as the "conscience of the

180 Scheflin, supra note 7, at 182 (quoting John H. Wigmore, A Programfor the Trial of a Jury,
12 AM. J.JuDIcATURE Soc'y 166 (1929)).
181Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1933); accord Peck v. State, 563 N.E.2d 554, 560
(Ind. 1990); see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,1132 (1972) (holding that:
the existence of an unreviewable and un-reversible power in the jury,
to acquit in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial
judge, has for many years co-existed with the legal practice and
precedent upholding instructions to the jury that they are required to
follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law).
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community" and to use their verdict to "send a message."'12 The
suggested approach may also allow for a more honest pronouncement of
the jury's role under Indiana's Constitution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From a historical perspective, we are far removed from the frontier
environment of 1850 Indiana. As a result, there is the temptation to
dismiss as irrelevant a document drafted at a different time and under
different circumstances. This 'living document' view presupposes that
events have changed and thus the Constitution must be applied in the
light of current history. However, a lay jury's significance to the
administration of criminal justice has not been diminished by the passing
of time. Whether in 1850 or in 1999, the jury "prevent[s] oppression by
184
the government";1 8 3 "protects against unfounded criminal charges";
serves as a "check on official power";18 5 and infuses "a slack into the
enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of
current ethical conventions." 186 Preserving to the jury the right to
determine the law in criminal cases is consistent with the historical
function of an ancient institution.

112James Joseph Duane, What Messages Are We sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them

to 'Send a Message' With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 565, 576-79 (1995); see also
Biegher v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 91 (Ind. 1985) (holding that it was no error in denying
motion for mistrial where State argued in dosing for the jury to "set an example for this
community" by its verdict).
'8 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,155-56 (1968).
184
Id.
Is Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 n.8 (1986).

18 McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942).
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